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This is one of three papers derived from research on NorthSouth trade 
performed in the System and Decision Sciences Area during the summer of 
1982. The aim of this research was, first. to construct a model of NorthSouth 
resource trade and then to use i t  as a framework for further work in gaming, 
negotiations, and interactive decision making. 
In this paper, a two-region general equilibrium macro model is con- 
structed to explore the impacts of oil prices on output, employment and the  
prices of goods in industrial economies. It is shown that the effects of an 
increase in the price of oil depend considerably on the initial prices. The 
author examines different regimes, looking a t  their policy implications and in 
particular the possibility of cooperative pricing policies. 
ANDRZEJ WTERZBICKI 
Chairman 
System and Decision Sciences 
A two-region general equilibrium macro model is constructed to explore 
the impacts of oil prices on output, employment and prices of goods in indus- 
trial economies. 
The industrial region is a competitive market  economy tha t  produces two 
goods (consumer and industrial) with three inputs (capital, labor and oil). It 
trades industrial goods for oil with another region. The oil-exporting region is 
a monopoly which sets the  price of oil. The general equilibrium of the model 
determines endogenously the price and level of output of industrial goods, the 
volume of exports and imports, and the utilization and prices of factors in the 
industrial economy. 
The results show that  an increase in oil prices can have a number of out- 
comes. Depending on the initial oil price, the real revenues of the oil exporter 
may ei ther increase or decrease. The rate of profit and net value of output in 
the industrial economy may also either decrease or increase,  depending on 
initial prices. This paper examines different regimes, looking a t  their policy 
implications, and in particular the possibility of the importer and exporter 
adopting cooperative pricing policies. 
A computer program (in BASIC) describing the model together with a 
number of runs are given in the Appendix. 
OIL PRICES. INDUSTRIAL PRICES AND OUTPUTS: 
A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MACRO ANALYSIS 
Graciela Chichilnisky* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The increased activity of OPEC in the early seventies produced some of 
the  most significant changes in t h e  international economy in t h e  post-war 
period These changes coincided with a renewed awareness of t h e  problems 
produced by the  exhaustibility of natural resources. An extensive l i terature 
on the  economics of exhaustible resources developed, based on t h e  study of 
intertemporal optimality a n d  efficiency of depletion paths i n  one-sector 
growth models, and looking a t  t h e  effects of marke t  s t ruc tu re  on price and 
depletion paths, e.g., Stiglitz (1974, 1976). Sweeney (1977) and Dasgupta and 
Heal (1979). 
*Professor of Economics, Columbia University. 
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A. Wierabicki for comments and suggestions. 
While it  is t rue that the intertemporal issues relating to depletion rates 
are the ones tha t  most readily spring to mind when considering extractable 
resources, there are in fact a number of issues related to the  pricing of such 
resources that can be analyzed in a static general equilibrium context. 
Amongst these are  the effects of resource prices on the relative prices of dif- 
ferent goods and services, their effects on international terms of trade, and 
their effects on the macroeconomic equilibria of the consuming countries. 
The prices of extractable resources are of course not unique in having such 
market effects, but  i t  is nevertheless the  case that these effects include some 
of the most widely-debated impacts of resource pricing policies. There is prob- 
ably a t  least as  much concern about the effects of oil prices on the 
macroeconomic equilibria of the consuming countries, on international terms 
of trade, and on the international distribution of wealth,* as there is about 
their effects on depletion rates. This paper emphasizes the behavior of inter- 
national resource markets and the  limitations this imposes on the  plans of 
both exporters and importers. 
Recent work in international economic theory has dealt with some 
aspects of these problems, e.g., Corden (1971) studied the short-run impact of 
oil prices within a one-sector (IS-LM) analysis of the world economy in which 
the  redistribution of world income in favor of OPEC is seen as raising overall 
propensities to save. However, i t  is not possible to  study the specific effects of 
oil policies on the  importing countries using this model. Findlay and Rodri- 
guez (1977) and Buiter (1978) studied a Fleming-Mundell model incorporating 
imports of intermediate goods, where the nominal price of oil is an exogenous 
variable to which a particular small open economy has to  adjust. In a more 
*The Rariloche model (see Chichilniaky, 1978) explored the long-run effects of self-sufficient growth 
patterns on output and distribution in the different regions, but no conclusions were drawn about 
the functioning of international markets, or about the main effects on employment, output and 
pricee within the industrial oil-importing economies. 
recent piece. findlay (1983) studies the relation between the volume of oil 
exported by a cartel and the levels of output and employment within an oil- 
importing country, using a model in which the nominal price of one aggregate 
good is determined endogenously.* Other recent pieces of work in t.his a rea  
are due to Dixit (1981), Harkness (1980), Sachs (1983) and Djajic (1981). 
In contrast with these works, this paper is an attempt to  construct a 
model that  is able to explain the domestic general equilibrium responses of an 
oil-importing country, a compe t i t i v e  m a r k e t  economy, to the pricing policies 
of a monopolistic exporter. The model fcrmalizes the  notion that the demand 
faced by the exporter shifts as a consequence of his own actions, through the  
impact of oil prices on the general equilibrium of the  importing region. OPEC 
is one example of a monopolistic organization which should be interested in 
the general equilibrium implications of its own actions. Similar eFfects have 
already been formalized by Pearce (1953, 1956), Hahn (1977) and more 
recently by Hart (1982), the latter two in a general equilibrium context.** I t  
will be shown here that  consideration by the monopoly of these general equili- 
brium effects leads to policy implications rather different from those obtained 
using partial equilibrium analysis or standard general equilibrium models. 
*However, the assumptions of Findlay's model rule out the study of certain important relationships 
between oil supplies, output and prices when the cartel's actions affect both the demand and the 
supply of the importing region, an issue which is at  the core of much of the present NorthSouth 
debate. For instance, in Findlay's model, the nominal wage in the importing region is assumed to 
be fixed, and, furthermore, real wages and rates of interest have no feedback on employment, ex- 
cept through real balance effects. Furthermore, the importing region produces one aggregate 
good, with the result that an increase in oil supplies unequivocally increases output and employ- 
ment. and reduces the price level in this region. In the long run, through the assumption of a posi- 
tive effect on demand of an increase in employment, the oil cartel is seen not t o  affect the level of 
employment, but to decrease the returns t o  factors instead. 
**These publications relate to our model in the sense that they study the general equilibrium 
responses of demand to monopolistic policies. Pearce (1853, 18%) studied a closed economy in 
which total demand responds in a general equilibrium fashion t o  the actions of a monopoly and ex- 
plored the implications of this response. More recently, Hahn (1877) studied the 'conjectural 
equlibria' of a closed economy, in which a firm attempts to  consider the general equilibrium re- 
percussions of i ts o m  actions. It appears that these works are quite closely related to  the ap- 
proach we follow here, and, indeed to the approach that seems most appropriate in the case of 
OPEC. In a recent piece, Hart (1882) examines in a general equilibrium framework the case of a 
monopolistic producer that can affect its o m  market. His approach contrasts with that adopted 
here in that the eKects of the firm's policies are on other firms, rather than on the demand the 
firm itself faces. 
I t  is clear that  the optimal pricing policy for OPEC will depend upon the  
elasticity of demand for oil in the oil-importing countries and tha t  this elasti- 
city must  be a total one, taking into account the effect of oil prices on output 
and employment in these countries. But, as mentioned in Dasgupta and Heal 
(1979, Chapter l l ) ,  this elasticity is likely to change because the equilibrium 
state of the industrial economy varies with different oil prices. Hence the  
total demand function facing the exporter may be very complex and have an 
elasticity that  varies significantly with the price, reflecting overall changes in 
output, employment and prices within the industrial economy. A better  
understanding of the behavior of this elasticity would be of great  value in 
predicting the consequences of alternative pricing policies. The present 
model provides a first step towards such an understanding. Moreover, when 
the general equilibrium effects of the  monopoly's policies are  taken into 
account, i t  is readily perceived tha t  oil prices may have a non-trivial effect on 
the prices of goods imported by the oil exporter and thus on the "real" elasti- 
city of demand for oil, measured in te rms of the power of the oil exporter to 
purchase industrial goods. These ideas are formalized in this paper: the  
effects of oil price changes are traced across the  equilibria of the  model 
through the  functioning of all markets in the importing region (markets for 
consumer and industrial goods, and for the  three factors of production). 
We prove here that  if oil prices are  initially low. an increase in the  price 
of oil leads to  an increase in the real revenues of the  oil exporter in te rms of 
industrial goods imported. Thus the  real elasticity of demand for oil is greater  
than -1 in this case, and the optimal policy of the  oil exporter is to  increase 
prices. 
However, after an oil price level % has been reached, further increases in 
price produce the  opposite result: the  real revenues of the oil exporter 
decrease. This is because increases in pS above jiS may in fact reduce total 
exports of industrial goods, either because of a fall in the ra te  of profit and  the  
output of industrial goods, or because of income effects within the industrial 
countries.  In t he  la t ter  case, increases in domestic demand exceed the 
increase in the  supply of industrial goods as the price of oil increases. There- 
fore t he  general equilibrium effect of higher oil prices is to reduce the  volume 
of industrial goods exported. 
A similar non-linear response takes place in the revenues of the  indus- 
trial  country: a t  low oil prices an increase in the price of oil leads to higher 
r e tu rns  on domestic capital, and tb higher levels of oveiall output, while the  
opposite occurs when oil prices s t a r t  from a high level. The specific condi- 
t ions under which these different "regimes" prevail, and  their  effect on output 
and  employment within the  industrial  economy, provide t h e  subject of this  
paper. Computer simulations of t he  situations obtained by varying the  (exo- 
genous) price of oil a re  given in t he  Appendix. 
A fur ther  issue which has  been extensively discussed, and  on which this  
paper may throw some light, is whether the  relationship between capital and 
energy is one of complementarity or  substitutability. Empirical evidence on 
th i s  i s  ambiguous (see Berndt and Wood, 1979), suggesting tha t  in some coun- 
t r ies  t h e  former is t rue  and  in o thers  the latter.  In the  following analysis, we 
shall show t h a t  in  some circumstances an  increase in  the  price of oil will lead 
t o  an  increase in the  general equilibrium re turn  on capital, whereas in o thers  
a decrease is observed. An increase in the return on capital can  be inter- 
p re ted  as  implying that ,  a t  the  aggregate level, capital and  oil a r e  behaving a s  
substitutes (an increase in  t he  price of a factor will raise the  demand for, and  
pr ices  of, substitute factors), while a decrease can be interpreted a s  showing 
complementarity between these factors. Hence the  aggregate cross- 
equilibrium relationship between capital and energy prices may display either 
complementarity or substitutability, depending on the values of parameters 
and endogenous variables. This point is developed further in Chichilnisky and 
Heal (1982). 
2. A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MACRO MODEL 
The model used here is based on Chichilnisky (1981), but has been 
extended to  include oil as an imported input which is traded for industrial 
goods. There are  a number of features which have been introduced primarily 
to keep the  comparative static analysis tractable, and which are not essential 
to the  results. These are the assumption of fixed-coefficient production 
processes, and the  assumption that  all wages are consumed in good B. The 
first (Leontief) assumption yields simple price equations, while the assump- 
tion concerning consumption simplifies certain cross-equilibrium relation- 
ships. Both can be relaxed without changing the basic qualitative features of 
the results - for example. similar results can be obtained from Cobb-Douglas 
production functions and from more general savings behavior. However, the  
increase in complexity is considerable. 
The industrial economy is represented by a competitive general equili- 
brium model with two produced goods and three  factors of production. In 
addition t o  the  production and savings assumptions mentioned above, it  is 
assumed tha t  factor supplies in the  industrial economy are  sensitive to  real 
factor prices. The supply of labor is thus an increasing function of the  real 
wage, and the supply of capital an increasing function of the  real return on 
capital. The assumption about labor supply is routine, but  that  concerning 
capital supply perhaps merits some comment. What we have in mind is a 
situation in which the  economy has a capital stock composed of machinery of 
differing vintages and thus differing efficiencies. The fraction of this that is 
actually used a t  equilibrium will therefore depend on the factor prices, and 
will increase with the price of capital.' .4lternatively this assumption could 
represent a form of factor mobility into or out of t he  region. The dependence 
of factor supplies upon their real rewards is assumed to  be linear. It  should be 
noted tha t  in spite of the linearity of the  factor supply equations and produc- 
tion functions, the  supply, demand and production aspects of the  model 
interact  in such  a way t h a t  i ts  equilibrium relationships and comparative 
static properties a re  highly non-linear: they a r e  in some cases  of t he  fourth 
order. 
The industrial  country produces a basic consumer good and a n  industrial 
good, denoted by B and / respectively. There a r e  three  inputs to  production: 
labor (L), capital (K) and oil ( I9 ). Oil is not produced domestically. In order 
to  simplify t h e  analysis, t he  production functions of this country a re  of t h e  
fixed-proportion type 
where LB , 1 9 ~  and KB denote inputs of labor, oil and capital into t he  produc- 
tion of the  consumer good, and  a l .  b l  and c l  a re  the  inverses of 
factor/output coefficients. Similarly. the  production function for t h e  indus- 
trial good is 
rS = min  (LZ/ a2 . dl/ b 2  . Ki/ c2) . (2) 
The associated or 'dual' price equations (assuming competitive behavior) a r e  
then 
*Aa an example, one could think of oil-consuming power plants of differing vintages and thus costs. 
The higher-cost plants are commonly brought into and out of production as relative prices change. 
where w denotes wages, pd denotes the price of oil, T the quasi-rent of capital, 
pz the price of the industrial good, and pg the price of the  consumer good. 
The factor rpz is a proxy for the user 's cost of capital, which enters  as a cost. 
Although the two production functions both specify factor use in fixed propor- 
tions, they are assumed below to have very hfferent oil use/output coeffi- 
cients. In addition, i t  is shown tha t  the patterns of demand imply substituta- 
bility between B and I. These two properties of the model imply tha t  there is a 
considerable amount of substitution in the use of factors in the economy as  a 
whole. In certain cases studied below this also implies significant changes in 
the elasticity of demand for oil as an input. We assume that  factor supplies 
are sensitive to prices. If the  price of the consumer good is taken as  the unit 
of measurement,  then labor supply is responsive to real wages:+ 
and capital is a function of the  r a t e  of profit T ,  i.e., 
Next we formulate the demand behavior, postulating tha t  a t  equilibrium the  
value of basic goods consumed equals wage income, i.e., 
p B ~ D  = WLS .** 
The market equilibrium conditions are  
L D = L B + L Z  
p~ ~ - 
*Although a is taken to  be positive here, it may in general be either positive or negative depending 
on whether labor supplies respond positively or negatively to wage increases. The response may be 
negative when leisure has a high level of utility, i .e . ,  there is a "backward bending" labor supply. 
**Demand behavior outside equilibrium is not considered here. 
where X? denotes exports of I. X: denotes imports of oil and the  superscripts 
D and S indicate domestic demand and supply. The last equation is a balance 
of payments condition. We assume that  the  industrial country produces no 
oil, so tha t  all of the  oil used must be imported ( d D  = xi). 
The national income identity (national demand equals national income) 
for this model 
p B ~ D  + pIID = ZUL' + T I ~ S  (9) 
is always satisfied a t  equilibrium, when all markets  are  cleared.* 
To summarize, t h e  model's exogenous variables are the  coefficients 
al , a2, b l ,  b 2 ,  c 1  , c2, and the  parameters a and 19 representing the  
*This is eesily verified by substitutmg for p ~  and pl from (3)  and (4) in the left-hand side of (9): 
pB B~ + pl ID = (alw + b  ~p, + c 1rpl)BD 
+ (a2w + b g , ,  + c  2771)(P - @) 
= w (a lBS  + a21s) + (c ,Bs+ c  ,IS) 
+ l ~ S  + b ZP) -Xfla2w + c  ~ r p ~  + b z ,,) 
= w ~ S + r p ~ K S + p , , x ~ - ~ , x -  . 
Since P,& = we obtain (8). 
responses of domestic factor supplies to prices. 
The model can be formalized more concisely a s  a system of five 
behavioral equations, ( I ) ,  (2), (5), (6),  (7), and nine equilibrium conditions, 
(8a--8i). The endogenous variables are: supply O F  I, 1'; demand for I ,  ID;  
exports of I ,  X: supply of B . B'; demand for B , gD: supply of labor, L ~ ;  
demand for labor, L ~ ;  capital supplied, KS; capital demanded. KD; oil supplied, 
29'; oil demanded, g D ;  oil imported, x:; and the  prices in all five markets,  i.e., 
ra te  of profit, r ;  wages, w ;  price of B , pg;  price of I , pl; and the price of oil 
pb- 
We therefore have 14 equations in 16 unknowns: in  the  usual general 
equilibrium fashion, the system can be solved up to one parameter value, tak- 
ing one good a s  a numeraire.  We choose the price of oil to  be the  exogenous 
parameter.  The prices tha t  emerge for the  other  goods are therefore relative 
prices. Because t h e  te rms of t rade between oil and  industrial goods represent 
a significant endogenous variable in  the model, and in order to  facilitate possi- 
ble empirical interpretation of the results, we choose B to be the numeraire,  
i.e., p~ = 1. The oil exporter is therefore assumed to adopt a pricing policy by 
which he se ts  t he  price of oil relative to tha t  of B. 
3. OIL PRICES. INDUSTRIAL PRICES AND EXPORT REVENUES 
We now study the general equilibrium responses of the  industrial econ- 
omy to  changes in  t h e  exogenously determined price of oil. This is very much 
a comparative s tat ics  exercise, and involves a certain amount of computation 
(see the  Appendix for details). The basic point is t ha t  as the  price of oil varies, 
the  equilibria of t h e  model will in general form a one-parameter family, i.e., 
they will describe a curve in the space of endogenous variables. Along this 
curve, t h e  prices of goods, wage and interest  rates,  output levels, relative 
prices of imports and exports (i.e., t he  te rms  of trade) and the  quantity of 
exports a r e  all endogenously related. We now study the behavior of these vari- 
ables across different equilibria. In order  to do this,  we make certain assump- 
tions about the production of consumer and  industrial goods tha t  simplify t h e  
computations. These are: 
1. M = a l b z  - a z b l  > 0, i.e., t h e  consumer good is relatively labor- 
intensive and the industrial good relatively oil-intensive. 
2. c = 0, so tha t  the  consumer good requires no capital inputs. 
3. b is small, so t ha t  the consumer good requires little in the way of oil 
inputs. 
Assumption 2 is  not strictly necessary to obtain the results: all t h a t  i s  
required is t h a t  B be significantly less capital-intensive than  I, so t h a t  t h e r e  
can  be substitution in t h e  aggregate use of factors. One could think of B a s  a 
non-traded relatively labor-intensive commodity, such  a s  services. Computer 
runs  of this model with c l  small, bu t  no t  zero, give similar resul ts  (see t h e  
Appendix). 
I t  is also shown in the Appendix t h a t  the cross-equilibrium relationship 
between the price of the industrial good relative to tha t  of the  consumer good 
( p I )  and t h e  price of oil relative to  t ha t  of t he  consumer good (pd) is: 
where 
Equation (10) implies t ha t  when condition 3 is satisfied (bl  is small), and  
a c z  < 2@alaZ (this is case A of Theorem 1 - see later),  the price of t he  indus- 
trial good relative to that of the basic good (PI) increases as the relative price 
of oil increases. Intuitively it is not surprising that a small b has this result; 
the industrial good is more oil-intensive than the basic good, so that  its price 
should increase with the price of oil. When b l  is not small, so that neither 
good is clearly more oil-intensive, the relative prices of the two goods may 
move in a more complex way in response to changes in the price of oil p d .  
We next study how the rate of profit T varies with the price of oil. The 
relevant expressions are: 
so tha t  T is a quadratic function of pd , r is zero when pd is zero or 1/ b and T 
attains its maximum at  pd = 1/ 2b 
These relationships are displayed in Figure 1. Their interpretation is 
related to the point made in the introduction about the complementarity or 
substitutability relationships between capital and oil emerging from the 
model. An increase in the price of oil always has two effects on the demand 
for capital: a substitution effect and an income effect. The substitution effect 
causes substitution of capital for oil. This occurs in the present model, not 
because of a shift along isoquants (there are fixed factor proportions in each 
firm), but because the relative prices of oil- and capital-intensive goods 
change. causing a change in demand patterns, production patterns and thus 
relative levels of employment of factors. The income effect simply reflects 
the fact that  an increase in the price of oil reduces income and thus demand 
in the industrial economy. This will tend to depress the re turn  on capital. 
What Figure 1 shows is that  the substitution effect of an oil price increase 
dominates a t  low oil prices, and the income effect a t  higher prices. The 
current  conventional wisdom that increases in oil prices depress the return 
on capital in industrial economies can thus be interpreted in terms of this 
model as showing that current oil prices must be in t h e  range 1/ 2 b  to 1/ b 
The dependence of r on p g  is also related to the issue of whether oil and 
capital a re  complements or substitutes. This point is developed further in 
Chichilnisky and Heal (1982). Here we just note that  (6) shows tha t  the  supply 
of capital increases with r ,  so that  the amount of capital used a t  equilibrium 
must increase and then decrease with the price of oil. This means that,  across 
equilibria, the cross-price elasticity of demand between oil and capital is first 
positive and then negative, implying a switch from substitutability to com- 
plementarity. Note tha t  the elasticity referred to here is defined in Chichilni- 
sky and Heal (1982) as a total cross-price elasticity. 
It is shown in t h e  Appendix that  exports from the  industrial t o  the oil- 
producing country satisfy 
and 
Two cases can be distinguished here. The first is when T is bounded below 
a l /  20,  in which case ~ X P  @ a has the  same sign as a ~ /  apd. Alternatively, if 
T can exceed a l /  20 ,  then ax?/ 3% will vary from negative to positive as pa 
increases, while ar/  apd varies from positive to negative. The first case is 
easy to interpret: as the  price of oil and the interest rate  rise, the supply of 
capital increases, and with it the supply of capital-intensive industrial goods. 
This facilitates an increase in the export of industrial goods. Conversely, when 
the interest ra te  falls, capital employed, production of industrial goods and 
the volume of exports all decrease. This is shown in Figure 1. The second case 
is more complex, and is portrayed in Figure 2. As p+ increases, and r with it, 
exports rise as long as r < a  2 0 .  .4t this point exports fall as r continues to  
rise, then rise as T falls, until T once more reaches a l / 2 D ,  a t  which point 
both X: and r move down as pd rises. What is happening in this case is that  as  
pfl rises, T increases and with it  the supply of capital and the output of indus- 
trial goods, as before. However, in this case the parameters of the system are  
such tha t  an increase in profits, all of which are spei~k on industrial goods 
(equations (9) and (7)), leads to an increase in the  demand for these goods 
which exceeds the  supply. The difference between supply and demand, which 
is exports, therefore falls. We can confirm this by noting tha t  this occurs 
when 
which can happen if and only if 
c 2  is the  inverse of the  capital/output ratio in the industrial goods sector: the  
higher the value of c 2  and the  lower the value of B (the responsiveness of capi- 
tal to  interest rates), the smaller the response of industrial output to the sup- 
ply of capital and hence to r and pd.  And it  is obvious that the  smaller the  
response of industrial output to capital supply, the  more likely it is that  out- 
put will fall short of the increase in demand, leading to a drop in exports. 
We have now prepared the ground for the main results of this section. 
Theorem 1 .  If the  initial pr ice  of oil pd .is l o w ,  an i n c r e a s e  in this pr i ce  w i l l  
i n c r e a s e  the  v o l u m e  of indus t r i a l  goods  e z p o r t e d  x?. However ,  once  the  p r i c e  
of  oil has r e a c h e d  a  c e r t a - h  u a l u e  jid, f u r t h e r  i n c r e a s e s  in this pr ice  w i l l  l ead  
t o  a  dec rease  in t h e  v o l u m e  of i n d u s t r i a l  goods  expor ted  x,?. m e r e  a re  t h e n  
t w o  poss ib i l i t i es :  
A. a c i  I Z p a l a 2 .  En. this c a s e ,  i n c r e a s e s  in t h e  pr ice  of oil t o  above  
pd = 1/ 2b dec r zase  t he  r a t e  o f  pro f i t  r in t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  e c o n o m y .  This 
d e c r e a s e s  t h e  t o ta l  c a p z t d  ava i lab le ,  a n d  thus decrease s  t h e  d o m e s t i c  s u p -  
p l y  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  goods a n d  t h e  v o l u m e  ava i lab le  for  e z p o r t  (see f i gure  I ) .  
Figure 1. Case A: acg C 2/3ala2, i.e.. r is always bounded below a l /  2 0 .  In this 
case the  volume of industrial exports initially increases with the  price of 
oil. For p4 > 1/ 2b l ,  however, X? decreases with further increases in p4. This 
is due to  the  effect of oil prices on the  r a t e  of profit in the industrial economy. 
1 
B. a c z  > 2 a a l a g .  Now  pd = (*I - (- - a  I ) )  B e t w e e n  % a n d  I/ 2 b  l ,  
2b 1 Y 
i n c r e a s e s  in t h e  pr ice  of oil r a i s e  t h e  r a t e  o f  p ro f i t  b u t  l o w e r  t h e  e z p o r t s  
1 
1 
o f i m d m t r i a L  goods .  Fbr - c p4 c +I+(- y4a1 )?i), an i n c r e a s e  in oil  
2b 1 2b 1 Y 
p r i c e s  l o w e r s  t h e  r a t e  o f  p r o f i t  a n d  r a i s e s  e x p o r t s ,  a n d  f o r  h i g h e r  oi l  
p r i c e s  b o t h  e z p o r t s  a n d  t h e  r a t e  of  p r o f i t  f a l l  as p* i n c r e a s e  (see  F igure  
2). 
Kgure 2. Case B: ac; > 2#lala2. so  tha t  r exceeds a l /  2D for 
( 1  1 - [(7-2a1)/ 7 p 1 2 b 1 ( 1  + [(7-2a1)/ 7 ) .  These Limits 
a re  indicated a s  Q and R, respectively, in  the  figure. This result  is due to  
cross-equilibria income effects: increases in t h e  price of oil increase the  r a t e  
of profit r ,  but this  produces increases in demand that  exceed increases in the  
supply of industrial goods within the  industrial economy. This also happens in 
Case A, but since r decreases with p,, in this la t ter  case, t he  total effect is t ha t  
the  volume of exports increases with p,,. 
The proof of this theorem is given in the Appendix. 
The final issue that  we shall discuss in this  section is t h e  relationship 
between the  price of oil and the  elasticity of demand faced by the  oil exporter. 
We a r e  interested in the  real elasticity of demand: the  real revenue of t h e  oil 
exporter is p,,~$/pl (as only industrial goods are imported), and  it is then 
natural  t o  define the  real elasticity a s  
It is shown in the Appendix that 
aqs  
q > 1 if and only if - > 0 
ap T9 
ax? 1 q < -1 if and only if - < O  . 
apd 
The behavior of the  elasticity of demand with respect to the price of oil is then 
as shown in Figures 3 and 4 for cases A and B of Theorem 1. 
Figure 3. Elasticity of demand as a function of p~ when acg 1 2@ala2 (Case 
A) - 
These results confirm our expectation tha t  the elasticity of demand fac- 
ing the oil exporter will change as the equilibrium of the  oil-consuming coun- 
t ry  changes.' A demand relationship as  complex a s  tha t  shown in Figure 4 has 
*The nominal elasticity of the demand for oil c can also be computed directly from its definition 
I 1 - a 2b. I4 Price of 0 i 1 . p ~  
Figure 4. Elasticity of demand as a function of po when a c  > 2/3ala2 (Case 
El). Here Q and R are  given by po = (I /  26 1)(1 + [(7-2al)/ 7]1W). 
- 
significant implications for the  optimal long-run monopoly pricing policy, 
which involves prices increasing a t  the same ra te  as  the demand elasticity 
changes (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979, Chapter 12). 
4. INDUSl'RlAL OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT 
We study now the effect of variations in the price of oil on the overall lev- 
els of output and employment in the  industrial country, across equilibria. 
We shall denote by Y  the  total value of (net)  domestic output, i.e., t h e  
value of total output minus the  value of the  imported input: 
Y = ~ ~ B ~ + ~ ~ I ~ - ~ ~ x ~  . 
C = 
2 b l ~ a ( a l b z  + azb l)(r - b a d )  
(1 - b ~ d ) ( a 1 b 2 b  lPd + azb 1 0  - b  lPd)) 
where 
and is therefore also seen to vary with the price of oil p*. 
Y is the overall domestic value-added in the industrial economy. Since a t  
equilibriump+~: = plx?and B' = gD, it follows that 
Y = p B ~ D  +plrD . (13) 
Our next aim is to compute changes in the equilibrium values of Y and of 
total overall employment L as  the price of oil pg varies. We first study the  
effect on employment. 
Note tha t  by (3), when c = 0 
Therefore, since L = aw, increases in pd always decrease overall employment 
when a > 0. When c # 0, a w /  apd can be either positive or negative. 
Next we study the  effect of oil prices on consumption. From (5), (6). (?), 
(9) and (13) 
so tha t  
2 Note t h a t  because p B ~ D  = aw a n d p B  = 1, and c l  = 0 
Therefore, when a > 0 and 0 I p d <  1/ b l ,  domestic consumption of B (gD)  
decreases as the price of oil increases. This does not necessarily happen when 
C l #  0. 
Finally, we use the above analysis to study how output Y responds to 
changes in p d .  Since r = 0 when p+ = 0, (14) and (15) imply that  overall out- 
put is a decreasing function of p g  for small values of p+. However, since 
dr/  apg 2 0 for p g  < 1/ 2 b  and b - 0,  Y is an increasing function of the price 
of oil when p g  is greater  than some small value (denoted by p;). This is due 
to  the fact that ,  as pd increases, the  value of the demand for I , p l ~ D  = p[@r2, 
also increases, since a r / a p g >  0 and a p [ / a p g 2  0 when 
1/ 2 
, see Figure 2. Since b is ra ther  small, the  increase 
in p l ~ D  in (13) will exceed the  decrease in the value of demand for B ,  B ~ ,  so 
that Y increases with the price of oil. 
Finally, note that  when p,, exceeds a certain value p$ , a Y / a p d  becomes 
negative again, because r = 0 when p,, = 1/ b , ar/ ap,, < 0 for pg > 1/ 26 l ,  
and a ~ ~ /  ap,, < 0, and T (apl/ apd) is bounded above by -(h!ac2b l /  pa la2)pd ,  
from (10)  and (11).  We therefore have the following situation (see Figure 5): 
Theorem 2. When the initial price of oil p,, is close t o  zero, a n  increase in this 
price lowers the level of n e t  overall domestic output in the industrial econ- 
omy. m e n  o i l  reaches a price pz ,  however, further price increases will 
increase overall output in the industrial economy. When pd reaches a value 
p$ > p $ ,  increasing the price o f  oi l  still further will reverse the situation 
once again, overall output now decreasing with increasing pd.  The overall 
level of employment in the economy decreases as the price of o i l  rises, as does 
the level of consumption 01 basic consumer goods. 
The fact t ha t  domestic employment and consumption of basic goods decrease 
monotonically with increases in the price of oil will occasion little surprise. 
What is less obvious is that there is a range of oil prices for which value-added 
increases with increases in the price of oil pd.  As indicated above, this occurs 
because, over a certain range of values, increases in pS lead to the substitu- 
tion of capital for oil, and hence to increases in both profits and demand. 
Figure 5. The behavior of overall output Y and employment L with increases 
in the price of oil, across equilibria. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In the previous sections we presented a simple general equilibrium model 
of an oil-consuming country, and used this to analyze the macroeconomic 
responses of such a country to changes in the price of oil. We studied the  
responses of outputs, prices, profits and consumption levels in the oil- 
consuming country, and showed how these depend on parameter values and 
the price of oil. A number of conclusions were relatively straightforward -for 
example, if c = 0 employment and consumption of B decrease as  the  price of 
oil rises. Others, however, were less obvious, suggesting that the full impact 
of an oil price increase is very complex. I t  was shown that  profitability first 
rises and then falls with an increase in the price of oil. The switch reflects the  
changing importance of income and substitution effects. Substitution of oil by 
capital bids up the return on capital, athough beyond a certain point this is 
outweighed by the demand-reducing effects of higher oil prices. Also not 
immediately apparent is the  fact that  in certain regions an increase in the  
price of oil may increase total value-added in the  oil-using economy. This is 
because in some cases i t  leads to an increase in profitability, as noted above, 
and hence to  increased demand. 
I t  emerges from this analysis that  there are certain situations in which 
an increase in oil prices may cause profitability and output in the industrial 
economy to rise, even though employment and consumption of basic goods 
will fall. In other situations, all four variables will decrease as the  oil price 
rises. In the former case, one cannot say tha t  the  increase in oil prices is 
unambiguously harmful: indeed, taking GNP as a welfare index, i t  could be 
judged beneficial. Another issue that  we examined was the effect of oil price 
changes on the export of industrial goods to  the oil producing country. This 
can be rather  complex: the  plot of real exports aganst oil prices may have 
ei ther  one or two maxima, which implies tha t  the cross-equilibrium demand 
function facing the oil exporter may be far removed from the simple functions 
often used in dynamic studies. We also characterized precisely how the elasti- 
city varies with the price of oil. 
One interesting implication of these results is that  there may be situa- 
tions where an increase in the  price of oil will benefit both oil exporters (by 
raising their real revenues) and oil importers (by raising their profits and 
GNP). These two groups are  therefore not always playing a zero-sum game. 
APPENDIX 
The Relationships Between P* and the 
Equilibrium Values of Endogenous Variables 
First note that  the production functions ( 1 )  and ( 2 )  yield equations for 
the demand for factors L ,  K, and 19 a t  each level of output, assuming that the 
factors are used efaciently: 
L~ = BSal + p a z  ( A  1 )  
Equations ( A  1) and ( k 2 )  imply that when factors are used efficiently 
B' = (c2LS - a , ~ ~ ) /  D 
where D is the determinant of the matrix 
The price equations (3) and (4) can be regarded as a system of two equa- 
tions in two variables, w and r ,  when p g  is a constant. From these equations 
we obtain 
Substituting LS and KS from (5) and (6), and w and T from (A.6) and (A.7) into 
(k4) ,  we obtain the  equilibrium values of the  supply of consumer goods BS as 
a function only of the  price of industrial goods pl: 
where 
N = c l b 2 - c 2 b 1  . 
Similarly, substituting the expressions for KS,  L ~ , W  and T into (A.5) leads to 
Now, from the demand relation ( 7 )  and the accounting identity (9), we have a t  
equilibrium 
~ D = T K ~  . (A 10) 
Therefore, when pg = 1, the equilibrium relation BS = B D  can be rewritten, 
using (5), (A.6) and (A.8), as follows: 
while from ( 6 ) ,  (A.9)  and (A.10), jS = jD + X? is 
(A. 11) 
(A. 12) 
From equation (9), equations ( A l l )  and (A12) are not independent a t  e'quili- 
brium. The implicit function theorem implies that  one can obtain, a t  least 
locally, a function pI = ~ ~ ( p , , )  from ( A l l ) .  Therefore, since p9 is given, t he  
value of pI a t  equilibrium can be obtained. This, with (A8) and (A.9), yields 
the  equilibrium supply of B and I, B' and IS .  Equilibrium values of wages and 
profits w and T can  be deduced from (A6) and (A?), and the  equilibrium use 
of inputs K' and L' from (5) and (6). This allows ID to be calculated from 
( A ~ o ) ,  so tha t  the volume of industrial  exports qS can  be found; the  volume of 
oil imported can then be computed from (8i). The model is therefore 'closed', 
i.e., i ts equilibria a re  predetermined (and locally unique) for given pd. When 
p,, is changed, the  equilibrium values of all endogenous variables will change. 
In particular, the volume of industrial exports X? and the i r  price pI will 
change, and our  next goal is to  compute how they change in relation to each 
other  across equilibria. We now make some assumptions which simplify the  
computations, and which are  discussed in more detail earlier in t h e  text. 
1. M = a l b  - a 2 b  > 0, i.e., B is more labor-intensive and I more oil- 
intensive. 
2. c = 0, i.e., B requires no capital inputs. 
3. b is small, i.e., B requires only a small input of oil. 
From ( A l l ) ,  using assumption 2 ,  one can obtain an explicit expression for 
PI = P I ( P * ) ~  
(A.  13) 
where 
and 
M = a l b 2  - a 2 b 1  
Consider now the possible range in which pg  can vary. From the price equa- 
tion ( 3 ) ,  w r 0 implies l /  b  l 2 p g  r 0, since c l = 0. From (A 13) we have, when 
p d  = 0. 
1 
and when pd = -, 
b  1 
(A.  14)  
Note tha t  since M > 0 ,  a z / a l  < b 2 /  b  We can now study the change in the  
price of the industrial goodpI as the  price of oil increases: 
The sign of (A.16) is therefore that  of the quadratic function 
f (J+) = -(Myb : ) p i  - ( 2 a z y b  : ) p d  t alM + a 2 y b l ,  which is i l lustrated in Fig- 
ure Al. 
f igure Al .  Plot of t he  quadratic function f ( p g ) =  - ( ~ ~ b  f)Pz 
- (2az7b 1 2 ) ~ ~  + a 1M + az7b 1 .  
I t  is easy to see t h a t  f ( J I ~ )  = 0 has only one positive root p G .  In order 
that  apI/  8pd  be  positive for all pd between 0 and I/ b i t  is necessary and suf- 
ficient t ha t  f ( I /  b > 0. But f ( l /  b = -My - yaZb  + Ma1 > 0 and so 
Therefore 8pI /  8pd  > 0 if and  only if 
@ l a z  > I  and b l <  b z (ga  la2 -ac :  
a c  22 g.2" I 
i.e., if we have case A discussed in the text ( a c g  I galaz)  and b l  i s  small. 
Now, from (3) 
(A. 17) 
and thus (4) implies 
Substituting for pI from (A. 13) we obtain 
(A. 18) 
(A. 19) 
Therefore T = 0 both when pB is zero and when i t  assumes its maximum value 
1/ b l .  The change in the rate of profit as the  price of oil varies is 
Since 
(A. 20) 
and T is quadratic in pd ,  it follows that  the rate of profit is an increasing func- 
tion of pd for p,? < 1/ Zb and a decreasing function for pd > 1/ Zb l. Since T 
attains its maximum value when p,? = 1/ 2b l, the maximum value of T is 
Note that the conclusion in fact requires only condition 2 above, i.e., tha t  
C 1  = o .  
We shall next analyze the response of the volume of industrial goods 
exported to changes in the price of oil. Since X? = lS -ID, we deduce from 
( 6 ) ,  (A.5) and (k10) that  
Therefore 
(A. 2 4 )  
Note that  r I E W  > a l /  2 0  if and only if 
(A. 25)  a c ;  > 2 p a l a 2  . 
Proof of Theorem 1 
Consider first the case where a c i  < 2@ala2.  Then r is always bounded 
above by a 1 / 2 D .  In this  case the si;. f ax?/apd is the same as that  of 
a r /  apd,  from ( k 2 4 ) .  Furthermore, ar/ apd > 0 for p+ s 1/ 2b and ar/ apd < 0 
for pd > 1 / 2 b l  from (A.19)--(A.22). Here as the rate of profit increases, the  
supply of industrial goods increases more than does the  domestic demand for 
these goods, since IS = a l p r /  D and I D  =pr2 (from (6), (A.5) and ( A l O ) ) ,  and 
a l / 2 D  > r ,  so that  a(IS-ID)/  ar = p [ ( a l /  D)-2r] > 0. 
Therefore, since x?= I -I and by ( ~ 2 4 )  ax?/apd 
= p[(a 0 ) - 2 ~ ] ( a r /  ap*), the volume of industrial goods exported a t  equili- 
brium @ will increase with increases in the price of oil for p* < 1/ 2b For 
p* > 1/ 2b however, this relation is reversed: increases in the price of oil will 
now decrease the volume of industrial goods exported across equilibria. In 
both cases considered here  this change in the reaction of industrial exports 
X? to  increases in the price of oil p* is related to the change in  the  response 
of the rate  of profit to  increases in the price of oil p*, as illustrated in Figure 
1. 
Consider now the case where acg > 2/3alaz. In this case r > a l / 2 D  for 
values of p,, near 1/ 2b l .  When r > a l /  2D . aIs/ & < aID/  ar . so that the  
increase in the supply of industrial goods is exceeded by the increase in the  
domestic demand as  the ra te  of profit rises, i.e., the cross-equilibrium income 
effect dominates the  price (or substitution) effect. In this case, the  reaction 
of the volume of industrial exports to  changes in the price of oil, aqS/ap4. 
depends both on the  sign of t he  change in the rate  of profit T , a r /  apd, and on 
t h e s i g n o f ( a l / D ) - 2 r .  I n f a c t f J ~ F / a ~ ~ = ~  a r / a p 4 = 0 , 0 r a l / D = 2 r .  
This occurs when pa = (1/ 2b ,)(lk[(y-2a 1)/ yI1"). It follows tha t  we have a 
succession of different situations as pg increases from 0 to  1/ b 
aT I. - a1 . ax? 2 0 and T < -, 1.e.-  2D 2 0 ap a ap 79 
a~ a I ax? 11. - 2 0 and r >-, i.e., - 2D < 0 a~ d a~ d 
ax? ar < 0 and r < - 1.e. - IV. - 1 0. 
*d 2 0  a~ d 
This is illustrated in Figure 2, and completes the  proof of the theorem. 
Behavior of the Demand Elasticity Facing the Oil Exporter 
Firstly, note tha t  the  "real" revenue of t he  oil exporter is pd~$/pI ,  which 
in an  international market  equilibrium equals ~ r ,  where ~ r  is the amount  of 
industrial goods imported and $ is the amount of oil exported. 
Now by definition t h e  real elasticity of demand for oil is given by 
since the demand is basically the  export demand. 
If R denotes real  revenues, then across equilibria we have for the  oil exporter 
It follows that  
- 
a(x$/ P I )  xi 
ap, '++ - ap I9 PI 
x2 
=---+,+I)  . 
PI 
Therefore aR/ ap, > 0 if and only if q > -1, or 1 q 1 < 1 for q < 0, and 
aR/++ < 0 if and only if q < -1  or  ) r ]  1 > 1, for q < 0. Since 
R = p,~i/pI = xY, i t  follows that  r ]  > -1 when p ,  < p, and q < -1 when 
P, > P,. 
Computer Simulations for the Industrial Country 
fin 1. The following parameter  and  factor response values were used: 
Table A l .  Results of the  first run ,  with c = 0. These results a re  i l lustrated in 
Figure A2. 
Exogenously 
set price 
of oil (pd) 
Values of endogenous variables 
Valun of 
Figure A2. Behavior of the endogenous variables as the  price of oil increases 
(run 1). 
Run 2. 
The following parameter  and factor response values were used: 
Table A2. Results of the second run ,  with c l  # 0. These results a r e  i l lustrated 
in Figure A3. 
Exogenously Values of endogenous variables 
set  price 
of oil (pd) 
Pz 7 w PZXS Y 
0.0 0.66890 0 . 5 5 7 4 ~ 1 0 ~  3.33332 0 . 3 3 7 1 5 0 ~ 1 0 ~ ~ ~  11.111 1 
0.5 0.85861 0.243452 3.16597 0.580648 10.1251 
1.0 1.10132 0.456505 2.99832 1.20033 9.44897 
1.5 1.41239 0.644688 2.83030 1.84227 9.18463 
2.0 1.80953 1.807918 2.66179 2.48953 9.44742 
2.5 2.30945 0.946045 2.49272 3.12497 10.3476 
3.0 2.91912 1.05883 2.32303 3.7312 1 11.9419 
3.5 3.61864 1.14595 2.15284 4.29064 14.1388 
4.0 4.33894 1.20707 1.98254 4.78579 16.5742 
4.5 4.95548 1.24203 1 .81282 5.20000 18.5754 
5.0 5.33000 1.25113 1.64444 5.5180 1 19.3906 
5.5 5.38881 1.23504 1.47782 5.72565 18.6234 
6.0 5.16262 1.19450 1.31278 5.80860 16.4559 
6.5 4.75047 1.12996 1.14877 5.75144 13.4507 
7.0 4.25777 1.04152 0.98521 5.5376 1 10.2080 
7.5 3.76058 0.929042 0.82168 5.14990 7.16683 
8.0 3.30079 0.792336 0.65794 4.57096 4.57735 
8.5 2.89531 0.631209 0.49390 3.7835 1 2.55107 
9.0 2.54664 0.445510 0.32955 2.77048 1.11951 
9.5 2.25047 0.235131 0.16490 1.5149 1 0.276035 
10.0 2.00000 0.385923~10-' 0. 0.257568~10-'~ 0 . 5 9 5 7 4 6 ~ 1 0 ~ ~ ~  
Valua of 
wramatars 
20 I 
Figure A3. Behavior of t he  endogenous variables as  the  price of oil increases 
(run 2 )  
Listing of the computer program (in BASIC) 
The computer  program used to  obtain t h e  resul ts  given in the  previous section 
is listed below. I t  was designed t o  r u n  on a Sharp microcomputer.  The param- 
e te rs  and  variables h scus sed  in t h e  tex t  a r e  re la ted to  t he  variables used in 
the  computer  program as follows: 
Text Program Text Program I Text Program 1 
solutions S 
Program Listing 
10 LF2 
11 TEXT 
12 CSIZE 1 
20 INPUT "ENTER ALPHA AND BETAV;AL, BE 
30 INPUT "ENTER Al,Bl,Cl";Al,Bl,Cl 
40 INPUT "ENTER A2,BZ,CZ";AZ,B2,C2 
45 INPUT "PRICE OF 0IL";PO 
48 LPRINT "(";AL; ".";BE;")" 
47 LPRINT "(" ;~1;" ," ;Bl ;" ," ;Cl ;")"  
48 LPRINT "(";a; ",";BZ;",";CZ;")":LFZ 
60 H = 1 - B l * P O  
7 0  M = Al*B2 - M * B 1  
9 0  GA = A L * C Z * C ~ / ( B E * A ~ )  
9 0  N = C l * B 2  - B l * C 2  
1 0 0  D = Al*C2 - A2*C1 
1 1 0  A5 = AL*C l*C 1 
1 2 0  B 5  = A L * c ~ * ( C ~  - 2*Cl*B2*PO - 2*C2*H) 
130 C 5  = AL*(CZ*C2*H*H+C1*C 1*B2*B2*PO*PO+2*Cl*C2*B2*PO*H-C2*C2-C2*POXN) 
+BE*Al *A2 
1 4 0  D 5  =-A~*BE*(PO*M+M) 
150 I F A 5  = 0 THEN GOT0 4 0 0  
160 P5 = B5/A5:Q5 = C5/A5:R5 = D5/A5 
170 A6 = (1/3)*(3*Q5-P5-2) 
1 0 0  B 6  = (1/27)*(2*P5-3-9*P5*Q5+27*R5) 
190 J 5  = (BE-2/4) +(~6-3/27) 
2 0 0  I F  J 5  >= 0 THEN GOT0 250 
210 Z 5  = ACS ((-B6/2)/SQR(-A6-3/27))):A9 = SQR(-A6/3) 
220 Sl  = 2 * ~ 9 * C o S ( Z 5 / 3 ) - P 5 / 3  
230 S2 = 2*A9*COS(Z5/3+ 1 2 0 ) - P 5 / 3  
240 53 =2*A9*COS(Z5/3+ 240) -P5 /3  
245 GOT0 420 
250 A7 = - B ~ / z + s ~ R ( J ~ ) : B ~  = -BG/z-SQR(J~) 
260 A0 = SGN(A7)*(ABS(A7))-(1/3) 
270 BS = SGN(B7)*(ABS(B7))-(1/3) 
280 I F  J 5  = 0 THEN GOT0 300 
290 S l  = A8+B8-P5/3:S2 = -1:S3 = -l:GOTO 420 
300 S1 = A8+BB-P5/3:S2 = -(A8+B8),/2-P5/3:S3 = -l:GOTO 420 
400 S1 = -D5/C5:S2 = -1:S3 = -1 
420 LET CO = 0 
430 IF CO = 0 THEN LET IP = S1 
440 IF CO = 1 THEN LET IP = S2 
450 IF CO = 2 THEN LET IP = S3 
460 IF C0>2 THEN GOT0 745 
470 IF IP>O THEN GOT0 500 
480 LET CO = CO+ 1 
490 GOT0 430 
500 R = ( ~ l  *( IP -~2*~0) -A~*H) / (D*IP)  
5 10 W = (H*C2-(IP-B2*PO)*C 1 ) / ~  
520 L = AL*W 
530 K = BE*R 
540 IS (Al*K-C1 *L)/D 
550 BS = (C2*L-A2*K)/D 
560 OL = BS*Bl+IS*B2 
570 ID = R*K 
580 X = IS-ID 
590 IF ABS(OL)<=0-(-8) THEN LET TT = 0 
600 IF ABS(OL)>lO-(-8) THEN LET TT = X/OL 
610 Y = BS+IP*ID 
620 LPRINT "PO =";PO:LFl 
630 LPRINT TAB2;"O =";OL:LFl 
640 LPRINT TAB4;"R =";R:LFl 
650 LPRINT TAB6;"W =";W:LFl 
660 LPRINT TAJ38;"IP =";IP:LFl 
670 LPRINT TAJ310;"NNI =";Y:LFl 
720 LET CO = CO+ 1:GOTO 430 
745 LET PO = PO+(.l/'Bl) 
750 IF P0>(.9/B1) THEN GOT0 999 
760 GOT0 60 
999 END 
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